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A FUTURE FOR THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIVE LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION? THE IMPLICATIONS OF KWAZULU-NATAL JOINT LIAISON 
COMMITTEE V MEC FOR EDUCATION, KWAZULU NATAL 
M Murcott 
What's in a name? That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet… 
William Shakespeare Romeo and Juliet, Act II Scene II 
1 Introduction 
KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal 
concerned the retraction of a promise to pay subsidies to independent schools.1 The 
MEC for Education in KwaZulu-Natal had granted a subsidy under section 48 of the 
South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 (the Schools Act) for 2009/2010 to independent 
schools in the province, represented by the applicant. In a 2008 notice the Department 
of Education, KwaZulu-Natal set out "approximate" funding levels for the schools for 
2009/2010.2 However, the Department did not pay the subsidies to the schools in the 
amounts indicated in the notice.3 It paid 30% less.4 The Department did so on the 
basis of budget cuts for the 2009/2010 financial year, and notified the schools of its 
intention to reduce the subsidies by 30% from May 2009. 
                                                 
  Melanie Murcott. LLB cum laude (University of Cape Town); LLM cum laude (University of Pretoria). 
Senior Lecturer, University of Pretoria. E-mail: Melanie.Murcott@up.ac.za. This paper was 
originally presented at the Administrative Law seminar of the South African Law Teachers 
Association Conference in January 2014. I am grateful for the opportunity to have presented the 
paper, and for the feedback and input of Professors Cora Hoexter, Geo Quinot, Michael Kidd and 
Hugh Corder following my presentation. I am also grateful for the input of the anonymous 
reviewers. Errors in the paper are, of course, my own. 
1  KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal 2013 4 SA 262 (CC) 
(hereafter KZN JLC) para 2. 
2  KZN JLC para 3. 
3  KZN JLC para 6. 
4  KZN JLC para 6. 
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The schools sought to enforce the Department's promise to pay the subsidies based 
on the notice of 2008 for the full year, without any reduction, relying on the law of 
contract.5  
The Centre for Child Law, as amicus curiae, submitted that a promise to pay a subsidy 
in terms of the applicable statutory and constitutional framework created a legitimate 
expectation in respect of the amount promised.6 It was contended that the promise 
to pay gave rise to an expectation of a particular outcome (payment of the subsidy), 
rather than an expectation that a particular procedure would be followed, giving rise 
to a substantive legitimate expectation that should be afforded substantive protection 
in the form of an order compelling the payment of the full amount of the subsidy 
promised. In other words the amicus curiae urged the court to develop the doctrine 
of substantive legitimate expectation in order to compel the payment of the subsidy 
to the schools. 
A majority of the Constitutional Court rejected the arguments of both the applicant 
and the amicus curiae, but nonetheless ordered the payment of a portion of the 
promised subsidy. For the court, a stumbling block in relation to the development of 
the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation was that it was not properly pleaded 
or relied upon by the applicant. The applicant had also expressly disavowed reliance 
upon the doctrine. Although courts are not bound by incorrect concessions of law,7 a 
majority of the Constitutional Court felt constrained by the applicant's stance. It 
chose,8 rather than to develop the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation, to 
                                                 
5  KZN JLC para 14. Although the applicant relied on contract as the basis for the relief sought, and 
disavowed reliance on the administrative law, during argument the applicant’s counsel glibly 
remarked that it "was 'neither here nor there' whether [the relief sought] derived from 
administrative action or 'something akin to a contractual obligation'" (KZN JLC para 31). 
6  KZN JLC para 27. 
7  See CUSA v Tao 2009 2 SA 204 (CC) para 68; Baront Investments (Pty) Ltd v West Dune Properties 
296 (Pty) Ltd 2014 6 SA 286 (KZP) paras 84-85. 
8  KZN JLC para 58. I refer to the court’s "choosing" consciously and deliberately. I will argue below 
that by adopting a substantive rather than formalistic approach, the court could have made a 
different choice: to adopt the doctrine, despite the manner in which the case was argued and 
pleaded. I say so because on the facts before the court the doctrine emerged as a potential legal 
basis for the relief sought by the applicant. My point of departure, which sees the potential for the 
court to make this choice in spite of the manner in which the case was pleaded and argued by the 
applicant, aligns with the views of Botha 2004 SAJHR 250-251 that: "legal materials do not apply 
themselves, but are constructed by human beings. Their meaning depends as much on the 
interpretive habits and reflexes of the interpreter as on the materials themselves". As Hoexter puts 
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formulate a new legal mechanism at public law. This mechanism, which bears close 
resemblance to the doctrine as developed under English law, offered some substantive 
protection to the schools represented by the applicant "on broader public law and 
regulatory grounds". The court created this new mechanism to afford the schools 
substantive protection in respect of conduct bearing all the hallmarks of administrative 
action without reliance on the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(PAJA).9 It did so through the enforcement of a publicly promulgated promise to pay 
on the grounds of reliance, accountability and rationality.  
In this paper I discuss the new legal mechanism created to enforce a publicly 
promulgated promise to pay created in KZN JLC, as well as the impact of this 
mechanism on the future scope of the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation. 
I begin by briefly describing the development of the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
in South African law,10 which had left the way open for the Constitutional Court to 
develop a doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation in KZN JLC. Thereafter I 
analyse the majority's approach in KZN JLC pursuant to which, rather than develop 
the doctrine, it invoked rationality review to enforce unilateral and publicly 
promulgated promises by government to pay. I then consider the impact of the 
majority's approach on the scope to develop the doctrine of substantive legitimate 
expectation in future. Finally, I discuss how the court's approach was "subversive of 
                                                 
it "judges are indeed social engineers, whether they know it or not" (Hoexter 2008 SAJHR 282). I 
appreciate that due to South Africa’s enduring formalistic legal culture my point of departure will 
not sit comfortably with some of the lawyers who read this paper. However, my point of departure 
is affirmed by the court’s rejection of a cause of action based on the doctrine in favour of another 
cause of action not pleaded by the applicant, based on rationality. The majority in KZN JLC makes 
an intriguing choice – the adoption of broad public law values as the basis to enforce a promise to 
pay, rather than the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in circumstances where neither cause of 
action was pleaded, and only the latter was argued (and only by the amicus curiae) as a basis for 
the remedy granted. The court relied on precedent in the form of Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 531 (CC) and Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 
2008 1 SA 566 (CC) as authority for the proposition that it was entitled to adopt a basis for the 
remedy granted that was not the cause of action expressly advanced or argued, since this "claim 
was apparent from the papers and the evidence" (KZN JLC para 68). 
9  The majority did so rather than accede to the amicus’ plea reflected in para 28 that the court ought 
not to "inquire formalistically whether the label 'legitimate expectation' was used, but must rather 
determine whether its elements…are pleaded and supported by the facts on record". 
10  Hoexter Administrative Law 434. 
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PAJA and the scheme in s 33 of [the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996]".11 
2 The doctrine of legitimate expectation under South African law 
The doctrine of legitimate expectation was first successfully relied upon in South Africa 
in the apartheid era case of Administrator, Transvaal v Traub,12 and has been relied 
upon in a number of cases since then. 13  Currently the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation entails that a reasonable expectation based on a well-established practice 
or an express promise by an administrator acting lawfully gives rise to legal protection 
when the practice or promise is clear, unambiguous and unqualified.14 The legal 
protection afforded usually (but not always as I illustrate below) takes the form of 
ordering that a fair procedure be followed before a decision is made in respect of the 
expected conduct.15 This is so even where the expectation is substantive in nature in 
that it entails the expectation of a particular outcome rather than the expectation that 
a procedure will be followed.16  
                                                 
11  See Hoexter "Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality" 68, where the author demonstrates that 
where there is an "accountability vacuum" because, for technical or formalistic reasons, PAJA is 
not applicable to the conduct under review, the courts have applied its requirements under another 
name: the principle of legality. Hoexter argues that this approach is open to abuse in a manner 
that is "subversive of PAJA and s 33 of the Constitution". It will be argued that the Constitutional 
Court followed the same approach in KZN JLC by applying standards of rationality and 
accountability in circumstances where PAJA had not properly been pleaded to an exercise of public 
power that arguably amounted to administrative action under PAJA, rather than applying PAJA 
directly. Although the principle of legality is not expressly invoked in KZN JLC, it is arguably the 
underlying basis for the majority’s reasoning. 
12  Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 4 SA 731 (A) (hereafter Traub). In Traub the court found 
that a long-standing past practice of appointing all the doctors recommended for a particular post 
had created a legitimate expectation that doctors who had been refused appointment would in 
fact be appointed or at the very least that they would be given a hearing before being refused 
appointment (ie a hybrid expectation that was both substantive and procedural in nature). The 
court afforded this expectation procedural relief: they were entitled to be heard if the administrator 
wished to depart from its long-standing past practice. 
13  Quinot 2004 SAPL 547. See further the cases discussed at Hoexter Administrative Law 394-396, 
421-425; 432-434. 
14  Quinot 2004 SAPL 546-547, referring to National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips 2002 4 
SA 60 (W) para 28. See also South African Veterinary Council v Szymanski 2003 4 SA 42 (SCA) 
para 20 and Duncan v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2010 6 SA 374 (SCA) 
(hereafter Duncan) para 15. 
15  This was the case in Traub as discussed in fn 14 above. Also see Nortjie v Minister van Korrektiewe 
Dienste 2001 3 SA 472 (SCA) para 14 and Quinot 2004 SAPL 547-548. See further Campbell 2003 
SALJ 293. 
16  Campell 2003 SALJ 293. Also see Duncan para 13, where Brand JA points out that both the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal have left open the question of whether or 
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However there are examples, though limited, of substantive protection being afforded 
to a legitimate expectation of a particular outcome (a substantive expectation). For 
instance, in Quinella Trading (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Rural Development the court 
assumed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation could afford substantive 
protection to a substantive expectation, by ordering the state to honour contracts in 
respect of a land claim, but did not refer to PAJA or clearly explain the basis for such 
protection.17  Ampofo v MEC for Education, Arts, Culture, Sports and Recreation, 
Northern Province is another example of substantive protection being afforded a 
substantive legitimate expectation, this time in the form of an expectation that a letter 
would be written confirming the terms of employment of the expectant parties.18 
Again, the court seemed to take for granted that it could protect this kind of 
expectation, and did not properly explain the basis upon which it did so. 
Premier Mpumalanga (a pre-PAJA case concerning the MEC for Education, 
Mpumalanga's decision that bursaries for certain students in state-aided schools would 
no longer be paid)19 is an example of substantive protection being afforded to what 
was cast by the court as a procedural expectation: the expectation that a procedure 
would be followed before a decision was taken.20 The effect of the court's order was 
to confer an advantage (ie to afford substantive protection) in the form of the payment 
of bursaries to the party whose legitimate expectation had been disappointed.21 The 
court did so on the basis of procedural unfairness in the decision-making process (a 
failure to give reasonable notice).22 The court cast the expectant party's expectation 
in procedural rather than substantive terms (an expectation that bursaries would be 
paid) in that "the previous conduct of an official ha[d] given rise to an expectation 
that a particular procedure will be followed before a decision is made", and that 
                                                 
not the doctrine of legitimate expectation should be extended to afford not only procedural but 
also substantive protection to a substantive legitimate expectation. 
17  Quinella Trading (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Rural Development 2010 4 SA 308 (LCC) paras 20-24. 
18  Ampofo v MEC for Education, Arts, Culture, Sports and Recreation, Northern Province 2002 2 SA 
215 (T) para 56. See further Hoexter Administrative Law 432. 
19  Premier Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State Aided Schools, Eastern 
Transvaal 1999 2 SA 91 (CC) (hereafter Premier Mpumalanga) para 1. 
20  Premier Mpumalanga para 38. 
21  Premier Mpumalanga paras 45-46. 
22  Premier Mpumalanga para 38. 
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procedure had not been followed.23 Because of the resulting procedural unfairness, 
the decision taken by the official was invalid and set aside, and the official was required 
to undertake the expected conduct: the payment of bursaries.24 Though the effect of 
the court's order was to afford substantive protection to the expectant party, the court 
found it unnecessary "to decide…in what circumstances, if any, a legitimate 
expectation [would] confer a right to substantive relief beyond that ordinarily 
contemplated by a duty to act fairly".25  
Post-PAJA, a legitimate expectation will receive procedural protection where a fair 
procedure was not followed in terms of sections 3 or 4 of PAJA in the decision-making 
process, and the expectant party had a right to or an expectation of a pre-decision 
hearing or notice. 26  In the absence of any procedural unfairness, substantive 
protection and a remedy under PAJA could conceivably be afforded in respect of a 
substantive legitimate expectation on the basis of a ground of review for unlawfulness 
or unreasonableness under section 6 of PAJA. 27  There is, however, currently no 
authoritative judicial precedent setting out whether, when or how a substantive 
legitimate expectation will be given substantive protection under PAJA.28 The courts' 
                                                 
23  Premier Mpumalanga para 35. 
24  Premier Mpumalanga paras 45-46. 
25  Premier Mpumalanga paras 48. See also para 36 and Hoexter Administrative Law 433. 
26  KZN JLC para 31 and fn 7. See also Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 6 SA 129 (CC) paras 28-37. 
27  Campbell 2003 SALJ 316-317. Also see Premier Mpumalanga para 41, where the court remarked 
obiter that "it may be that in many cases a retroactive termination of benefits will not be fair no 
matter what process is followed unless there is an overriding public interest". 
28  As discussed above, the Constitutional Court left the development of the doctrine open for another 
day in Premier Mpumalanga, where a legitimate expectation was found to afford procedural 
protection in the form of reasonable notice that was not afforded the affected schools. It did so 
again later, in Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier of the Province, Western Cape 2002 3 
SA 265 (CC) (hereafter Bel Porto), where reliance on a legitimate expectation was not properly 
pleaded. Quinot 2004 SAPL discusses Premier Mpumalanga and Bel Porto in detail. More recently 
in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
109 the court again avoided deciding whether or not the doctrine of substantive legitimate 
expectations could form part of our law when it held, in the context of residents resisting their 
eviction from an informal settlement, that: "There was extensive argument concerning the 
legitimate expectation that 70% of houses built in the Joe Slovo settlement would be allocated to 
Joe Slovo residents who qualify. The applicants point out correctly that this was not done in the 
first two phases of the three-phase development. But the respondents say that this failure was 
due to circumstances beyond their control. It is not necessary to go into the complex argument 
concerning substantive and procedural legitimate expectation so competently advanced before us. 
The issue can be appropriately accommodated in the justice and equity analysis. To my mind, the 
highest at which the legitimate expectation argument can be put is that there was a promise that, 
as far as was possible, 70% of the accommodation would be made available to Joe Slovo residents 
who qualify. The state says that it has not been possible to accommodate Joe Slovo residents in 
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unwillingness to develop the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation thus far 
raises the spectre of whether it will do so in the future.  
According to Hoexter, 29  the court's reluctance to afford substantive legitimate 
expectations substantive protection stems from a judicial concern of: 
... enforc[ing] promises or practices where this would undermine the basic 
requirement of legality [i.e. result in officials acting ultra vires their powers] or…have 
the effect of fettering the future exercise of an agency's discretion. 
For Campbell 30  the challenge of affording substantive protection to substantive 
legitimate expectations relates to: 
... the complexities in preventing legitimate expectations from hardening into rights 
and in accommodating the constitutional rule whereby the judiciary respects the role 
and functions of public officials and does not usurp their powers and discretions. 
For both Hoexter and Campbell the development of the doctrine of substantive 
legitimate expectation is challenging due largely to concerns relating to the separation 
of powers. Given the challenges outlined by Hoexter and Campbell, one can begin to 
understand why, in cases where the Constitutional Court has been asked to determine 
whether a legitimate expectation could confer a right to substantive relief, it has 
avoided doing so, and left the question of the substantive protection of substantive 
legitimate expectations undecided and open for determination in the future. KZN JLC 
presented another opportunity to afford substantive protection to a legitimate 
expectation notwithstanding the applicant's position in this regard, since on the facts 
before the court the doctrine emerged as a potential legal basis for the relief sought 
by the applicant. Again the court declined to develop the doctrine, choosing instead 
to afford substantive protection to the schools through a different legal mechanism of 
another name.  
                                                 
phases 1 and 2. The state is now prepared to consent to an order in terms of which 70% of the 
houses yet to be constructed at Joe Slovo will be allocated to Joe Slovo residents. The legitimate 
expectation of the applicants will be sufficiently satisfied to render the relocation just and 
equitable." See further, the cases discussed by Hoexter Administrative Law 421-436. 
29  Hoexter Administrative Law 427. 
30  Campbell 2003 SALJ 294. 
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3 KZN JLC – Rejection of the law of contract and the administrative law 
as the bases to afford substantive protection to the schools 
In KZN JLC the majority afforded the schools some of the substantive relief they 
sought. It did not, however, do so on the legal basis that the schools asserted: the 
law of contract. Similarly, the court refused to afford protection to the schools on the 
basis of administrative law under the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation, 
as the amicus curiae urged the court to do. Rather, the court created a remedy on a 
legal basis not expressly pleaded or argued by any of the parties. In what follows I 
discuss the court's rejection of the arguments of the applicant and amicus curiae. 
3.1 The schools' contractual arguments 
In KZN JLC the schools sought to enforce the Department's promise to pay subsidies: 
... on what [they] simply and persistently described as an enforceable undertaking 
to pay the entire year's subsidy without any reduction. This cast the claim in 
contractual, or ostensibly contractual, terms.31 
The majority rejected the schools' contractual arguments, since the government's 
promise to pay subsidies "was not extended as part of a bilaterally binding agreement, 
which is the hallmark of contractually enforceable obligations".32  
Froneman J, in his separate concurring judgment, disagreed. 33 He argued that there 
was evidence of both offer and acceptance of the subsidies.34 He also contended that 
the mere fact that the Department's powers derived from legislation and could also 
give rise to administrative law remedies did not mean that there was no intention to 
contract.35 Froneman J sought to integrate the rules of public and private law by 
regarding them as a "fluid continuum"36 and rejecting the idea that administrative law 
or other public law considerations prevented the promise of a subsidy and its 
acceptance being recognised as a contract.37  
                                                 
31  KZN JLC para 58. 
32  KZN JLC para 35. 
33  KZN JLC paras 97-98. 
34  KZN JLC paras 97-98. 
35  KZN JLC para 103. 
36  Hoexter Administrative Law 451 referring to Quinot State Commercial Activity. 
37  KZN JLC paras 100-107. 
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In contrast, the formalistic judgments of Nkabinde J and Zondo J (Mogoeng CJ and 
Jafta J concurring) respectively adopted the view that the Department had not made 
any enforceable promise because it had not committed itself to "exact amounts".38 
Further, in contrast with the majority, for the minority the absence of an enforceable 
contract was the end of the school's case. The minority (per Zondo J) all but chastised 
the majority for having picked the schools up and making them "stand upon a different 
case".39 
In my view, there is merit to Froneman J's approach to the contractual arguments 
raised in KZN JLC. By focussing on the substance of the relationship between the 
parties rather than the labels or names ascribed to their conduct, I submit that it was 
open to the majority to conclude that a binding agreement had been concluded 
between the parties. However, the focus of this paper is the majority's creation of a 
new remedy, the enforcement of a publicly promulgated promise to pay. 
3.2 Administrative law abandoned? 
Not only did the majority in KZN JLC reject the school's contractual arguments, it also 
found that administrative law could not be applied.40 Although the Department's 
refusal to pay subsidies as promised arguably amounted to "administrative action" for 
the purposes of PAJA,41 this was not what the schools had pleaded.42 The schools 
could have relied on PAJA, for instance, on the basis that a decision of an 
administrative nature had been taken – the refusal to pay subsidies. This decision, 
having been taken by an organ of state exercising public power conferred on it in 
terms of the Schools Act and related provincial legislation and regulations, adversely 
affected the right to basic education of learners in a direct (final) and external way. 
The Department's conduct would thus appear to satisfy the "palisade of qualifications" 
contained in the definition of "administrative action" in PAJA. 43  Accordingly, the 
                                                 
38  This paper does not delve into the deeply formalistic approaches of the dissenting judgments. 
39  KZN JLC para 158. 
40  KZN JLC para 33. 
41  The conduct would seem to satisfy all the elements of the definition of "administrative action" in 
PAJA. 
42  KZN JLC para 19. 
43  Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 6 SA 313 (SCA) para 21. 
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decision could well have been susceptible to review on the grounds contained in 
section 6 of PAJA. However, the schools did not pursue a review application, which 
they would have been required to do within the 180-day period prescribed by section 
7 of PAJA, nor did they call for a record from the Department.44  
For the majority, it was the school's failure to call for a record in terms of the normal 
procedure for an administrative law review application that foreclosed the invocation 
of PAJA,45 since: 
The record of the budget allocation and decision-making would have been highly 
pertinent to a claim to enforce a promise at administrative law. It is not before us. 
The result is that, despite the amicus' argument to the contrary, it is not possible to 
consider the applicant's claim for payment for the whole of the 2009 school year on 
the basis that the Department breached the right to just administrative action when 
it revoked [its] undertaking in May 2009.46  
Froneman J adopted a different approach. He resisted the idea that the possibility of 
invoking administrative law ought to turn exclusively on the use of formal labels or 
procedures.47 In relation to the school's failure to call for a record, he held that: 
The rule exists principally in the interests of an applicant, and an applicant can choose 
to waive a procedural right. In this case, where a litigant brings proceedings against 
the state, 'the latter can always, in answer to an ordinary application, supply the 
record of the proceedings and the reason for its decision'. There was thus nothing in 
the form of the proceedings in the High Court that prevented the first and second 
respondents from producing the record of the budget allocation and decision-making 
in regard thereto, or anything else they considered relevant. They could have done 
it whether the claim was based in contract or in administrative law. The blame for 
their failure to do so cannot be laid at the applicant's door.48 
Applying Froneman J's logic, the schools would not have been barred from pursuing 
relief under PAJA merely because they did not call for a record. Froneman J's logic, 
which avoids the subversion of "substance…to form and principle to technicality",49 is 
more in keeping with the transformative mandate of the Constitution than the 
majority's more formalistic approach, which as I argue below resulted in limited 
                                                 
44  KZN JLC paras 31-32. 
45  In terms of Uniform Rule of Court 53. 
46  KZN JLC paras 32-33. 
47  KZN JLC para 86. 
48  KZN JLC para 86. 
49  Hoexter 2004 SALJ 604. 
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substantive relief outside of PAJA.50 The Constitution's transformative mandate entails 
a commitment to "social transformation" 51  through "substantive adjudication", 52 
especially in cases concerning access to basic education and the provision of subsidies 
that enable such access. The Constitution's important transformative goals ought not 
to be undermined by formalism. They require a substantive application of the law and 
a departure from formalism. Importantly, despite its refusal to apply PAJA, the 
majority "eschewed formalism"53 to the extent that it was nonetheless prepared to 
grant the schools some of the relief they sought, following the creative approach that 
I address in the next part of this paper.  
4 Substantive protection of a promise to pay – the protection of a 
substantive legitimate expectation by another name? 
Although the schools' contractual arguments and the amicus curiae's administrative 
law arguments were not invoked as a basis to enforce the Department's promise to 
pay subsidies, the majority of the court was willing to enforce the promise and provide 
at least some of the substantive protection sought by the applicant "on broader public 
law and regulatory grounds". 54  This was because the promise "created a legal 
obligation unilaterally enforceable at the instance of those who were intended to 
benefit from it".55 The court found that: 
... a public official who lawfully promises to pay specified amounts to named 
recipients cannot unilaterally diminish the amounts to be paid after the due date for 
their payment has passed. This is not because of a legitimate expectation of payment. 
Legitimate expectation relates to expected conduct. Rather, this principle concerns 
an obligation that became due because the date on which it was promised had 
already passed when it was retracted.56 
 Thus, for the majority of the court, the fact that the due date for performance had 
passed was a crucial factor. It was only after that date that the schools could enforce 
                                                 
50  See Hoexter 2008 SAJHR 281. 
51  Davis and Klare 2010 SAJHR 404. 
52  Hoexter 2008 SAJHR 281. 
53  KZN JLC para 82. 
54  KZN JLC para 58. 
55  KZN JLC para 48. Here the court claimed that the idea that government would be bound by its 
unilateral promises to pay is "nothing new". It did so by relying on pre-PAJA authority, without 
explaining why this case remains applicable to conduct bearing all the qualities of administrative 
action post-PAJA, in circumstances where PAJA had not been relied upon by the schools. 
56  KZN JLC para 52. Author’s emphasis. 
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a promise to pay.57 To the extent that the Department gave notice of the reduction 
before the due date of payment, the schools were left without a remedy, given their 
disavowal of PAJA. However, once the due date had passed the Department's "hands 
were tied": it had to make payment as promised.58 
The bases upon which the Department was found to be obliged to pay subsidies once 
their due date for payment had passed were "reliance, accountability and 
rationality". 59  Significantly, although these bases are aspects of the principle of 
legality, and are thus applicable to all public power, they are also classic principles of 
the administrative law. Although these bases are aspects of the principle of legality, 
and are thus applicable to all public power, they are also classic principles of the 
administrative law. Thus, classic principles of administrative law were invoked in KZN 
JLC despite the court's purported abandonment of the administrative law. Reliance is 
the basis, in administrative law, upon which administrators are precluded from varying 
or revoking their decisions, once they are functus officio. 60  A central role of 
administrative law is to ensure accountable government by controlling some forms of 
public power: administrative action.61 Rationality is a ground of review in terms of 
section 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA, requiring that administrative action must be rationally 
connected to the purpose for which it was taken, the purpose of the empowering 
provision, the information before the administrator and the reasons given for it by the 
administrator. For the court to reject the application of the administrative law under 
PAJA on the grounds that it was not pleaded only to place reliance upon the same 
principles (cast as broad constitutional principles) that would in any event have been 
applicable had PAJA been properly pleaded is a curious approach that I discuss more 
fully below. Before doing so I consider the manner in which the principles of reliance, 
accountability and rationality were applied in KZN JLC. 
                                                 
57  See further KZN JLC paras 56-57. 
58  KZN JLC para 62. 
59  KZN JLC para 63.  
60  Hoexter Administrative Law 277.  
61  See s 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 which sets out a number of 
accountability enhancing principles applicable to administration in every sphere of government. In 
relation to the application of these principles in the context of administrative law, see for example 
Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council 2013 1 SA 170 (SCA) and Stacey 2007 SAPL 79. 
M MURCOTT   PER / PELJ 2015(18)1 
3145 
 
First, the schools were found to have relied upon the "crystallised" entitlement to 
subsidies that had fallen due in their planning and budgeting.62 Secondly, the court 
found that accountability dictates that "[i]t can never be acceptable in a democratic 
constitutional state for budget cuts to be announced to those whom undertakings 
have been made after payment has by regulation already fallen due".63 Lastly, the 
court found it irrational to revoke a promise when the time for its fulfilment has already 
expired.64 This was because "it is impossible to tailor behaviour and expectations to a 
promise made in relation to a period that has already passed".65 Thus the Department 
was ordered to pay the subsidies on the basis that: 
Accountability and rationality demand that government prepare its budgets to meet 
payment deadlines. It cannot reach back and diminish accrued rights in order to 
manage its own shortfalls.66 
Given the irrational revocation of a promise to pay, the majority did not require further 
evidence in relation to the Department's budgetary constraints.67 Further, the majority 
held that there was no "overriding public interest in the ex post facto retraction of the 
promise".68 
The effect of KZN JLC is that substantive protection is now available where: 
(1) government has made a publicly promulgated promise to pay;  
(2) the due date for payment has fallen due;  
(3) the promise has been relied upon;  
(4) accountability and rationality demand that the promise be enforced; and 
(5) there is no "overriding public interest in the ex post facto retraction of the 
promise". 
In other words, government's refusal to honour a publicly promulgated promise to pay 
may be subjected to review on rationality grounds without the need to institute a 
review under PAJA, even where the conduct under review amounts to administrative 
                                                 
62  KZN JLC para 63. 
63  KZN JLC para 64. 
64  KZN JLC para 65. 
65  KZN JLC para 65. 
66  KZN JLC para 71. 
67  KZN JLC paras 68-70. 
68  KZN JLC para 66. 
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action. This observation underscores the first remarkable feature of the majority 
judgment. In spite of its refusal to enforce the Department's promise to pay under 
administrative law, ostensibly because a full record of the decision had not been 
obtained, 69  the court invoked rationality, a requirement of administrative law 
encapsulated in section 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA, as a basis to do so. What is more, none of 
the parties had placed reliance on rationality. Thus, at the level of form, the majority 
rejected administrative law as the basis upon which to protect the schools, but at the 
level of substance, it was prepared to invoke rationality as a basis to do so outside of 
the administrative law. It is in this sense that the majority judgment "eschews 
formalism"70 and rejects the idea that formal labels, or names, are more important 
than a substantively just outcome. I support the rejection of formalism and the 
resulting subjection of the Department's decision to the requirement of rationality, no 
doubt as a component of the principle of legality (though this is not articulated in KZN 
JLC).71 At the same time, though, the majority's approach falls to be criticised as being 
subversive of section 33 of the Constitution and PAJA.72 As I explain below, a further 
retreat from formalism could have seen the majority invoke rationality and develop its 
substantive potential in terms of administrative law under section 33 and PAJA, instead 
of independently thereof.  
Another remarkable aspect of the majority judgment which raises the question of 
whether it was invoking the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation by another 
name is that the grounds upon which the majority relied to enforce the promise to 
pay – reliance, accountability and rationality, and overriding public interest – mimic, 
to a great extent, those on which a substantive legitimate expectation may be 
                                                 
69  KZN JLC para 32. See further para 34. As I shall discuss later, for some reason, this "dearth of 
evidence" was of no concern to the court in enforcing the promise invoking broad constitutional 
principles that are also classic principles of the administrative law. 
70  KZN JLC para 82. 
71  This is in keeping with the transformative mandate of our Constitution which requires "the 
promotion of 'a culture of justification' in public-law interactions” as argued in Hoexter 2008 SAJHR 
286, referring to Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 31 and subsequent publications drawing from that work. 
72  Hoexter "Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality" 65. 
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enforced under English law.73 In developing the doctrine of substantive legitimate 
expectation the English courts have held that: 
... the law will hold a public authority to its promise or practice unless there is good 
reason not to do so … as "a requirement of good administration, by which public 
authorities ought to deal straightforwardly and consistently with the public".74 
These bases for the enforcement of a substantive legitimate expectation at English 
administrative law bear a striking similarity to the grounds in KZN JLC for the 
enforcement of a promise to pay, namely "crystallised reliance", "accountability" and 
the absence of "an overriding public interest" in not enforcing the promise. Under 
English law, a further requirement for the protection of a substantive legitimate 
expectation is that its denial would not be a "proportionate response".75 This basis is 
echoed in a somewhat watered down sense in the finding of KZN JLC that "[r]evoking 
a promise when the time for its fulfilment has already expired does not constitute 
rational treatment of those affected by it".76 A promise is accordingly capable of being 
denied where this is objectively justifiable, under English law as a proportionate 
measure, and pursuant to KZN JLC in South Africa, as a rational measure. The bases 
upon which a promise to pay will be enforced pursuant to KZN JLC are therefore 
strikingly similar to the bases upon which substantive legitimate expectations are 
protected under English law. At least in theory, these bases could potentially in future 
be invoked towards developing a doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation under 
South African administrative law.  
The question of whether the court was invoking the doctrine of substantive legitimate 
expectation by another name in KZN JLC is raised also because the Department's 
promise to pay subsidies was the kind of promise that would typically receive 
protection under the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation at English law.77 
                                                 
73  Hoexter Administrative Law 429 referring to R (Abdi and Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department 2005 EWCA Civ 1363 para 67. 
74  Hoexter Administrative Law 429. 
75  Hoexter Administrative Law 430. In the context of tax relief, it has also been held that a legitimate 
expectation will be afforded substantive protection where it would be irrational or unreasonable 
not to do so. See R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Unilever 1996 STC 681 discussed 
in Hoexter Administrative Law 428. 
76  KZN JLC para 65. 
77  In R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan 2000 3 All ER 850 (CA) discussed 
in Hoexter Administrative Law 429, the court held the authority to its assurance (its promise) that 
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Indeed, the express promise to pay subsidies, and an established practice of making 
payment, would also typically secure at least procedural protection under the doctrine 
of legitimate expectation developed in South African law discussed above.78  
Yet the majority in KZN JLC disavowed reliance on the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation to offer substantive or procedural protection to the schools. Could it be 
said, nevertheless, that it relied upon the doctrine by another name (was the 
mechanism used for the enforcement of a promise to pay in KZN JLC the rose that 
smelled as sweet)? I think not, given that the substantive relief granted to the schools 
was narrower than would have been the case had the doctrine of substantive 
legitimate expectation been developed under PAJA. The substantive relief awarded 
was limited to payments that had been promised and that were already due. The 
Department was not ordered to pay subsidies not due (ie those that were only 
"expected").79 Though the distinction between payments that were due and those that 
were expected is arguably unfounded, it is also potentially a saving grace for the 
doctrine. In criticising the distinction between payments promised and payments due, 
Froneman J convincingly argues: 
The substantive justification the main judgment gives for preventing a public official 
from retracting a lawful promise to pay an amount to someone after the date for 
payment has passed is that it is “legally and constitutionally unconscionable” when 
tested against the standards of “reliance, accountability and rationality”. But the 
same may be said of the promise to make payments for the whole year… 80 
In other words, as Froneman J points out it would be no less legally and 
constitutionally unconscionable to refuse to pay an amount promised but not yet due 
to the schools than it would to refuse to pay an amount that has fallen due. Reliance, 
rationality and accountability demanded in this case that once the payment was 
promised and expected it ought to be paid. For Froneman J the rationale for protecting 
a promise to pay an amount that had fallen due applied equally to the amount 
                                                 
it would keep a facility for disabled people open, the applicant, a disabled person, having relied 
upon that promise, and "there being no overriding public interest to justify the disappointment of 
the applicant". 
78  As was the case in Premier Mpumalanga discussed above. 
79  KZN JLC para 52. 
80  KZN JLC para 83. 
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expected.81 Thus the majority could have afforded the same substantive relief as that 
afforded to a substantive legitimate expectation.82 It declined to do so, adopting a 
narrower approach.83 On the majority's approach, only the subsidies due as at May 
2009 were payable to the schools. The nature of the narrower substantive relief 
granted to the schools in KZN JLC renders it something other than the doctrine of 
substantive legitimate expectation by another name – and smelling slightly less sweet. 
What does this mean for the future development of the doctrine of substantive 
legitimate expectations? Because of the distinction between "expected" payments and 
payments that are due, I believe that KZN JLC has not foreclosed the possibility of the 
doctrine’s being developed in future litigation. By creating a broad public law or 
regulatory remedy to enforce the promise to pay subsidies that are due, the court left 
open the question of whether: 
... had the matter been pleaded or evidenced differently, there may have been a 
legitimate expectation entitling the applicant to payment of the final three tranches 
of the 2009 school year subsidy [not yet due].84 
In this sense then, the distinction between payments that were due and those that 
were merely expected in the majority judgment was arguably a saving grace for the 
future development of the doctrine. The distinction left the space for the doctrine to 
be developed at administrative law in respect of expected conduct, instead of review 
for rationality under the principle of legality foreclosing the possibility of its 
development. Where a publicly promulgated promise to pay has become due it will no 
longer be necessary to rely on the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation, as 
KZN JLC may be invoked as the authority to enforce the promise. In this limited 
respect, by creating a new legal mechanism to enforce a publicly promulgated promise 
to pay a payment that has fallen due, KZN JLC may have narrowed the future scope 
for the development of the doctrine. Litigants need not seek to develop the doctrine 
                                                 
81  KZN JLC para 85. 
82  As Froneman J contends (KZN JLC para 90), the "substantive logic or reasoning" of the majority 
"reaches further than it is prepared to countenance". 
83  Perhaps the majority did so due to unarticulated concerns regarding the separation of powers, 
though its express basis for doing so related to the manner in which the case was pleaded and 
argued. 
84  KZN JLC para 69. 
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under PAJA when they can rely on rationality review under KZN JLC as precedent to 
enforce a publicly promulgated promise to pay that has fallen due. 
5 Going behind PAJA in KZN JLC  
As I have demonstrated above, because the Constitutional Court has created a remedy 
to enforce a publicly promulgated promise to pay "on broader public law and 
regulatory grounds",85 litigants will now be able to challenge public power without 
relying on PAJA in circumstances where: 
(1) government has made a publicly promulgated promise to pay;  
(2) the due date for payment has fallen due;  
(3) the promise has been relied upon;  
(4) accountability and rationality demand that the promise be enforced; and 
(5) there is no "overriding public interest in the ex post facto retraction of the 
promise". 
KZN JLC is thus authority for the proposition that even where the revocation of a 
promise to pay is administrative action, there is no need to rely on PAJA to review the 
conduct. Rationality review will be available under the broad constitutional principle 
of legality.  
As Hoexter86 argues, apart from being subversive of PAJA, the review of administrative 
action outside of PAJA "is subversive of the scheme laid down in s 33 of the 
Constitution", "whose purpose is 'to establish a coherent and overarching system for 
the review of all administrative action'". Hoexter87 goes on to state: 
The PAJA is, or ought to be, the first resort in any administrative law matter on the 
basis that it is intended to give effect to the rights in s 33 and because it essentially 
codifies those rights. For these reasons the Constitutional Court has emphasised that 
constitutionally mandated legislation such as the PAJA must be used where it is 
applicable, and it has cautioned that litigants may not go “behind” the PAJA by 
resorting directly to s 33 or the common law. 
                                                 
85  KZN JLC para 58. 
86  Hoexter "Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality" 65, 66, referring to Chaskalson CJ in Minister 
of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 118. 
87  Hoexter "Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality" 65. See further Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) (hereafter Bato Star) paras 21-
26. 
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In essence, resort to PAJA is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, which 
generally requires litigants to rely on the more specific norm (such as national 
legislation) before invoking a general norm (such as a constitutional right). 88 
Moreover, "PAJA, for all its problems, offers litigants some degree of certainty about 
what the requirements of administrative justice are and what circumstances will attract 
them".89 
Yet in KZN JLC the Constitutional Court followed the trend adopted in Albutt v Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation by ignoring its own advice in relation to 
this issue.90 The majority did so by going "behind PAJA" to create a new public law or 
regulatory remedy for the enforcement of a publicly promulgated promise to pay. The 
danger of "sidestepping" PAJA in difficult cases such as KZN JLC is that it "will soon 
become redundant". 91  In addition, by invoking an alternative basis to afford 
substantive relief to the schools, the transformative potential of PAJA to foster 
accountability and rational decision-making so as to achieve social change and fulfil 
the Constitution's transformative mandate is arguably undermined.  
So what ought the court to have done? Froneman J's judgment demonstrates that to 
the extent that "a label given to a claim is decisive", it was possible to uphold the 
schools' claim under contract law. 92  However, the conduct under scrutiny could 
comfortably have been subject to review under PAJA, had the schools' case been 
                                                 
88  See Hoexter Administrative Law 119. 
89  Hoexter "Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality" 67-68, discussed in Murcott 2013 SALJ 269. 
See further Kohn 2013 SALJ 812, who discusses the current judicial trend of invoking rationality 
review in parallel to review under PAJA and argues that a risk of reliance on the principle of legality 
and "its seemingly malleable rationality requirement" is not only the subversion of PAJA contended 
for by Hoexter, but also that "in developing such an expansive substantive conception of rationality 
review – in the absence of meaningful engagement with the prescripts of the separation of powers 
doctrine – and thereby increasing their reservoir of judicial power, the courts may be perceived to 
be expanding their supervisory review jurisdiction in a manner that amounts to an affront to this 
doctrine". This criticism does not apply to KZN JLC, to the extent that PAJA could have been utilised 
to secure more (rather than less) expansive relief than was awarded pursuant to rationality review 
(in other words, the court did not unduly expand its supervisory review jurisdiction). The criticism 
is probably relevant, however, in relation to the court’s failure to "meaningfully engage with the 
prescripts of separation of powers" as a possible basis for its refusal to develop the doctrine of 
substantive legitimate expectation in KZN JLC. 
90  See Murcott 2013 SALJ 266-270, where the author criticises the avoidance of PAJA in Albutt v 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC). 
91  Hoexter "Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality" 66. 
92  KZN JLC para 85. 
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properly pleaded and argued. Given this, it is arguable that the majority ought to have 
decided KZN JLC with reference to PAJA, in spite of the schools' approach.93 Whilst 
properly pleading a cause of action is undoubtedly desirable,94 the absence of formal 
labels ought not to inhibit substantive adjudication of the administrative law and the 
culture of justification and social transformation this entails, especially in cases 
concerning access to basic education and the provision of subsidies that enable such 
access.95 Where a claim under PAJA is apparent from the papers and the evidence, 
"even if it was not the cause of action expressly advanced or argued",96 it ought to be 
possible to invoke PAJA, and the courts ought to do so, even in the face of an incorrect 
concession of law by the applicant. In other words, whilst it would be preferable for 
PAJA to be expressly relied upon in cases such as KZN JLC, where in substance the 
elements of administrative action and the basis for review are apparent from the 
evidence, courts should be willing to retreat from formalism and invoke PAJA rather 
than creating new remedies. Indeed, judicial reliance on PAJA even in circumstances 
where it is not expressly relied upon received approval in Bato Star in O'Regan J's 
finding that: 
Where a litigant relies upon a statutory provision, it is not necessary to specify it, but 
it must be clear from the facts alleged by the litigant that the section is relevant and 
operative. I am prepared to assume, in favour of the applicant, for the purposes of 
this case, that its failure to identify with any precision the provisions of PAJA upon 
which it relied is not fatal to its cause of action. However, it must be emphasised that 
it is desirable for litigants who seek to review administrative action to identify clearly 
both the facts upon which they base their cause of action, and the legal basis of their 
cause of action.97 
The majority in KZN JLC, though willing to grant a new public law or regulatory remedy 
applying a substantive approach, was unwilling to retreat from formalism so as to 
expressly invoke PAJA in the manner approved by O'Regan J in Bato Star.98  
                                                 
93  As O’Regan J points out in Bato Star para 26, where PAJA is applicable to a case, the case ought 
not to be decided without reference to it. 
94  Bato Star para 28. 
95  Hoexter 2008 SAJHR 288. 
96  KZN JLC para 68. 
97  KZN JLC para 27. 
98  KZN JLC para 27. 
M MURCOTT   PER / PELJ 2015(18)1 
3153 
 
It is arguable that the majority's reticence to invoke PAJA is largely attributable to 
PAJA itself. With its "technical barriers" and complex definitions,99 PAJA sanctions 
"conceptualism" and formalism, and "stultifies" the transformative potential of 
administrative law.100 For instance, the requirement in terms of section 7 of PAJA to 
launch review proceedings within 180 days was seen as an obstacle to reliance on 
PAJA in KZN JLC, as was the failure to secure a record.101 These technical barriers are 
invoked by judges in a formalistic manner that prevents substantively just outcomes, 
including in relation to the protection of socio-economic rights such as education, in 
cases where PAJA has not been properly relied upon by litigants. An extreme example 
of this kind of formalism is arguably contained in the dissenting judgments in KZN JLC. 
The dissenting judgments offered no relief to the schools! For more creative judges, 
avoiding PAJA's technical barriers resulted in the creation of a new legal mechanism 
in KZN JLC: the enforcement of a promise to pay as a broad public law or regulatory 
remedy. By creating this mechanism the majority in KZN JLC filled a perceived 
"accountability vacuum" arising from the schools' failure to properly plead and argue 
their case.102 For the schools concerned in KZN JLC, the partial relief that they received 
pursuant to this new legal mechanism was doubtless a far sweeter prospect than no 
relief at all. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper I have explained that the way was open to develop the doctrine of 
substantive legitimate expectations to afford substantive protection to a publicly 
promulgated promise to pay subsidies to schools in KZN JLC. However, ostensibly 
because of the manner in which KZN JLC was pleaded and argued by the applicant, 
the majority did not develop the doctrine. Nor did the majority rely on the contractual 
or administrative law arguments presented to it by the applicant and the amicus curiae 
respectively. Instead, (somewhat ironically) the majority developed the law so as to 
create a new legal mechanism not expressly pleaded or argued before it by any of the 
                                                 
99  Most notably, the definitions of "administrative action" and a "decision". 
100  Hoexter 2008 SAJHR 288-289. 
101  KZN JLC paras 31-33. 
102  Hoexter "Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality" 68, referring to Taggart "Province of 
Administrative Law Determined" 3. 
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parties so as to afford substantive relief to the schools in respect of that portion of the 
subsidies that had fallen due for payment before the promise to pay had been 
retracted. 
Although the underlying bases of this new legal mechanism bear a striking 
resemblance to those of the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations developed 
under English law, I have argued that the mechanism cannot be described as the 
doctrine by another name. It is narrower, as it applies only to the enforcement of a 
promise to pay where the payment has become due, and not where the payment is 
merely expected. Further, though the distinction between payments that are due and 
those that are merely expected falls to be criticised, as the reasons for enforcing 
payments that are due arguably apply equally to the enforcement of payments that 
are expected, I have suggested that the effect of the distinction was to leave the way 
open for the development of a doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation under 
PAJA in future, except in relation to a small category of cases where the KZN JLC 
mechanism will apply. Although the way is open, whether the courts will in fact 
develop the doctrine is uncertain, given the courts' reluctance to do so thus far. One 
potential barrier to the development of the doctrine could be the court's apparent 
reluctance to "engage meaningfully with the prescripts of the separation of powers",103 
given the risk, in affording substantive protection to a substantive expectation, of 
ursurping the role of the executive.104 Another potential barrier would seem to be the 
current trend of subverting PAJA in favour of rationality review under the more flexible 
principle of legality. Indeed, as I have pointed out, since the conduct at issue in KZN 
JLC was theoretically capable of being reviewed in terms of PAJA, the creation of an 
alternative mechanism based on broad constitutional principles in KZN JLC (principles 
that are also inherent in administrative law) amounts to yet another example of the 
subversion of PAJA and section 33 of the Constitution.105 I have, however, suggested 
that an increasingly formalistic approach to the application of PAJA contributes to this 
trend. In situations that "cry out for a remedy",106 PAJA is avoided where the labels 
                                                 
103  Kohn 2013 SALJ 812. 
104  Campbell 2003 SALJ 294. 
105  Hoexter "Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality" 68. 
106  Traub 62. 
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and procedures it seems to demand are lacking. One of the unfortunate consequences 
of this trend in cases like KZN JLC is that the transformative potential of PAJA to foster 
accountability and rational decision-making so as to achieve social change and fulfil 
the Constitution's transformative mandate is undermined.  
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